# Ports

#### The ports are not being revitalized now per Davison, 12.

#### Two impacts-

#### Without restructuring the US will not be able to compete and food prices will rise because of faulty port facilities. That Marber and Doms. High food prices will ravage Chinese food supply per Carlson, and China will lash out and face economic collapse due to a starving population (Serewicz) causing nuclear war.

#### 3.

#### 2Insecure ports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks which are the “single most realistic proven threat vector” that’s Forbes 11. Terrorism causes lash out and nuclear extinction per Morgan, 9.

# Grid

#### Failing grid is inevitable from numerous threats. Montgomery 12 isolates several scenarios which make meltdowns likely and several days long. That’s Cappiello. This duration will cause nuclear reactors in the northeast to overheat and meltdown releasing radioactive clouds. That’s Wasserman.

### Meltdowns- 2ac A2 Impact Defense

#### Catastrophic melt-downs are likely if the blackout both cascades and is sustained- that is the Capiello evidence.

#### And prefer our impact- it’s specific to sustained melt-downs throughout the Northeast US- it will spread globally

#### And impact defense doesn’t apply to US reactors- extended licensing periods and unique risk of US designs to meltdowns

Natural Resource Defense Council 11
What if the Fukushima nuclear fallout crisis had happened here? <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fallout/>

A future severe nuclear accident at a U.S. nuclear power plant is a real possibility. In 2011 five nuclear power plants in the United States lost primary power due to earthquake or extreme weather events, including tornados, hurricanes, and flooding. Fortunately backup power systems kicked in at these plants and a disaster was averted. But weather is not the only risk factor. Other risk factors include: Type of reactor – There are two types of reactors operating it the United States: Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Some experts judge that the design and structure of BWRs do not protect against the release of radiation during a severe accident as effectively as PWRs. The four reactors involved in the Fukushima nuclear crisis were BWRs. On the map, NRDC experts assigned a red flag to a reactor if it is a BWR. Age of reactor – Reactors were designed to operate for 40 years, yet the regulatory body that oversees nuclear safety in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has re-licensed some nuclear power plants to operate for 60 years, well beyond their originally engineered design lifetime. On the map, NRDC experts assigned a red flag to a reactor if the NRC has approved the reactor to operate for 60 years. Power level of reactor – The NRC has approved many utility operators to increase the operating power of their nuclear reactors, including for Fukushima-type reactors, and in some cases multiple times and to significantly higher power levels. These so-called "power uprates" push reactors beyond what they were originally engineered to do, and could increase the radiation hazard if a nuclear accident occurred. On the map, NRDC experts assigned a red flag if the NRC has granted a reactor a power uprate. If a person received one rad of radiation from a nuclear accident, it would increase one's chance of getting cancer by 1 in 1,000 (averaged over all ages and both sexes). And although the NRC believes that the chances of a severe accident with fallout in a core meltdown for any one of the 104 U.S. nuclear reactors is small (probability of less than 1 in 10,000 per year), can we afford the risk? Millions of Japanese people were exposed to radiation from Fukushima, increasing their risk of developing cancer, and the cost of the Fukushima accident is projected to exceed US$100 billion, and the environmental effects will last for generations. What if a meltdown occurred at one of the 65 nuclear power plants in the United States? Why we need urgent federal action to reduce the risks of U.S. nuclear accident fallout With 6 million Americans living within 10 miles of a U.S. nuclear power plant – the evacuation zone defined by the federal government – and more than 120 million Americans living within 50 miles of a U.S. nuclear power plant – the distance the U.S. government told Americans to evacuate from the area around the Fukushima plant – we cannot afford to stand by and hope the worst won't happen here, especially with extreme weather intensifying around the globe. Red flags for heightened risk factors of a severe nuclear accident abound in the United States. Currently 23 U.S. nuclear reactors are the same type of reactor, a boiling water reactor (BWRs), which was involved in the Fukushimaaaaa nuclear disaster. Some BWRs are operating near major American cities like Philadlephia. Nearly all of the 104 nuclear reactors operating in the United States were designed and built three to four decades ago. Despite being originally engineered for a 40-year lifespan, the NRC has approved 71 reactors at 32 nuclear power plants to operate for 60 years. And 90 percent of U.S. nuclear reactors have had their operating power increased beyond the original design engineered for them. Yet the NRC hasn't yet made a single U.S. nuclear power plant any safer than it was since the Fukushima accident about one year ago. After the Fukushima disaster, a task force assembled by the commission's chairman identified a list of safety improvements including top tier items to be "started without unnecessary delay." But these important safety upgrades are still years away from being implemented, if ever. In fact, some of these safety improvements have been on the commission's to-do list since the 1990s. What happens in a severe nuclear accident like at Fukushima Even after the nuclear chain reaction at a power plant is stopped by its operators, the reactor core still needs to be continually cooled, or the fuel rods will rupture and melt from the remaining radioactive decay heat. And if the level of cooling water falls below the core, the metal sheaths containing the uranium in the fuel rods will react with steam, producing explosive hydrogen gas. Therefore if power to run reactor core cooling is lost just for a matter of hours, it can lead to a meltdown – potentially releasing plumes of radioactive material into the air. In Fukushima an earthquake caused the regional electric grid to go down, cutting off the nuclear plant's primary power. Then a tsunami flooded the low-lying diesel generators that were in place to provide backup power. Without power to cool the cores of its three fueled reactors, the severe accident at Fukushima began. Operators had to vent radioactive gases into the air in an attempt to reduce mounting pressure inside the reactor vessels. Hydrogen gas ignited and exploded in the reactor buildings, spewing plumes of radiation. Some of this fallout was blown out to sea by prevailing winds, but a plume of intense radiation spread northwest from the stricken plant for more than 50 miles. Because of the radioactive materials deposited by the plume, including cesium-137 and strontium-90, large areas in Fukushima Prefecture will be uninhabitable for generations. Lower levels of radiation drifted across other Japanese states and as far as Tokyo. NRDC's methodology for building the U.S. nuclear fallout map NRDC's nuclear fallout calculations were made using the weather reports from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for the specific days of March 11, 2011 and March 12, 2011. Using this historical weather data from the first days of the Fukushima accident, NRDC modeled where the radiation plumes released at Fukushima would have spread if it were a U.S. nuclear reactor that had melted down. For this work NRDC used the Department of Defense computer model "HPAC" – Hazard Prediction Assessment Capability. Some of the fallout patterns extend far from the nuclear plant, carried by strong winds blowing on those days. At other plants where the air was still in mid-March 2011, the fallout hovered over and settled on the vicinity of the plant. In our computer model of these severe nuclear accidents, the accident takes place over the course of two days with multiple releases of radiation, similar to what happened at Fukushima. As the wind changed direction over that period of time the fallout may be carried in different directions from the plant. Also shown in NRDC's map are the U.S.-government defined 10-mile evacuation zone, and 50-mile zones where the potential for land contamination would still be high in a severe nuclear accident.

# General K Frontline 2AC

### 2AC – Framework

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### (\_\_\_) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### (\_\_\_) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### (\_\_\_) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Vague alt theory:

#### Their alternative is vague.

#### -They cannot articulate the specific outcome of it.

#### Without a solid alternative the neg can shift their advocacy. This creates an unfair strategy skew because the neg can just shift out of any offense the aff has. This justifies abusive permutations.

#### Vague alts also destroy aff ground. We can’t get specific dis adds to the alt when we don’t even know what the alt does. This forces us to go for generic defense against the alt destroying topic specific education. This is bad for debate.

#### The round has already been skewed from the 1NC. The only way to fix the harms the vague alt has created in the round is to reject the team.

#### And

#### Extinction of the species is the most horrible impact imaginable, putting rights first is putting a part of society before the whole

**Schell 1982**

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137 uw//wej)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that **our species is the most important of all the things that,** as inhabitants of a common world, **we inherit from the past generations**, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about extinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For **the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to destroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room,** or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, however, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding characteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated somewhere outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

They say pan

**Their K is useless in crafting policy response to Chinese action**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

Criticism also exists for the epistemological basis of mainstream IR theory, positivism, resulting in provocative theoretical positions. The basic claim of post-positivists is that mainstream theory claims that knowledge as objective and immutable when all knowledge is actually subjective and contingent. A theorist cannot have objective knowledge because reality can only be observed by a subject, the theorist. Knowledge, therefore, is articulated in terms of inherently subjective discourses. 156¶ Recognizing the subjectivity of mainstream IR’s supposedly objective knowledge leads to two main conclusions. First, mainstream IR is inaccurate in its understanding of the world, so awareness of subjectivity will allow for greater explanation and engagement with reality. Second, mainstream IR knowledge hides the value judgments inherent in subjective claims by positing their objectivity. This places them beyond question, elevating their power. The reproduction of dominant IR discourses oppresses the less powerful by marginalizing their discourses. 157 For example, critical theorists argue that mainstream IR discourse is implicitly masculinized, excluding women from positions of power and from consideration of the effects of theory and policy. 158 Critical theorists attribute many if not all of negative outcomes in international politics to exclusive, dominant discourses. War, for example, often results from the reproduction of dominant discourses of statist power. 159 Consequently, the goal of critical theory is “emancipatory,” a normative attempt to resist power. Resistance is attempted through exposing subjectivity, promoting the discourses of the oppressed, and otherwise attempting to change the discursive climate to loosen the grip of dominant discourses. 160¶ While purely critical approaches may be interesting or **even more correct**, they are **basically useless for policymakers**. Robert Cox distinguishes critical theory from problemsolving theory, where the latter does not question dominant discourses and institutions but tries to get them to **“work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble**.” Mainstream IR theory fits this description. Critical theory tries to affect the real world as well, but it tries to enact broad social change instead of focusing on specific problems. 161 **This will not do for policymakers**, who **have to** craft responses to **specific issues like the rise of China**. 162 As Waltz argues in a response to Ashley and Cox, problem-solving theory needs to make assumptions regardless of their objectivity: “**The alternative is simply to eschew such [problemsolving] theories altogether**. Would we then know more or less about the social and the natural worlds?” 163

**This is a reason to combine approaches pragmatically via the permutation**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

This brief overview of some of the different theoretical positions applied to the rise of China should give an idea of the quandary of the policymaker. The debates between different theoretical positions are complex and obscure, but the differences in prescribed policy can be enormous. For example, should the U.S. pursue economically independent trade policies with China? Isolating all other competing theoretical factors, the decision can come down to technical methodological agreements. A policymaker **has to make a choice**, and she has little way of knowing which choice is correct. And the problem is all the more serious when theorists claim that **the wrong choice could lead to great power war.** One possible option is to choose a theory and stick with it. This would make analysis and decisions straightforward. Additionally, it would establish predictability in policy behavior, reducing security concerns stemming from uncertainty. But there are two major drawbacks. First, the theory could be wrong. Dogmatically pursuing an incorrect theory would be much more disastrous than tentatively wavering between different theories. Second, some theories do not apply to every aspect of a relationship, creating indeterminate decisions. ¶ Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to solve this problem is Peter J. Katzenstein’s case for “**analytical eclecticism**.” 173 Analytical eclecticism attempts to abandon the deep theoretical backing behind different theoretical positions, and **combine relevant elements of implemented theory in “explanatory sketches**.” 174 The benefit of the approach is that is allows flexible access to a large amount of relevant knowledge **without having to take sides in the theoretical debates**. Analytical eclecticism could be the best option, but there are four potential problems. First, it assumes complementary theoretical combinations, but the real problems are when different theories are contradictory. 175 Promoting deep economic interdependence is either a good idea or a terrible one, and combining realist and liberal understandings on trade is probably impossible. Second, it artificially elevates constructivism because constructivism’s greater compatibility with other theories. Third, it discounts theories that make few contextual claims. In particular, offensive realism’s long-term forecast of conflict between China and the U.S. will not necessarily manifest itself with any signs at this stage. Consequently, policymakers might be tempted to ignore its warnings for greater descriptive ability. My point is that this creates a systemically arbitrary criterion for theory selection, not that offensive realism ought to be followed. Fourth, it allows policymakers to pick and choose theoretical elements that fit their personal preference. This could be seen as a good way to empower policymakers, but it is also arbitrary.

#### Alt precludes the possibility of change ensuring it does nothing.

Belu 05

(Dana S., Brooklyn College, Inquiry, “Thinking Technology, Thinking

Nature,” 2005, accessed via Academic Search Premier//wyo-mm)

Feenberg thus sees technology as a socially transformable event. On his account, any critique of technology must imply a redemption that contains a positive content. While Heidegger presciently indexes the pervasively technological character of modern life, his critique fails to account for the emergence of concrete possibilities of change. In this he is at one, albeit for different reasons, with the dominant instrumental interpretations that view technical making as inherently value free.

#### Heideggarian politics justify that mass extermination of humans.

Hotam 09

(Yotam, PhD. of The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Exchange Mosse Professor at the UW-Madison, and Fellow of the Franz Rosenzweig Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History, History of European Ideas, “Overcoming the mentor: Heidegger's present and the presence of Heidegger in Karl Löwith's and Hans Jonas’ postwar thought,” 2009, Taylor and Francis//wyo-mm)

This last connection between Heidegger and Nazism demonstrates the full extent of Löwith's postwar anti-Heideggerianism. Heidegger is not characterized as a naïve philosopher who blindly fell into the Nazi abyss; rather his philosophy is charged with providing no less than the theoretical foundations for the Nazi crimes, meaning first and foremost the mass murder of human beings by means of human technology. The best way to illustrate the depth of Löwith's connection between these elements (the death of God, nihilism, and mass murder through technology) is to evoke the ancient legend of the ‘Golem’ and to refer to its modern implications. The legend of the Golem addresses the creation of an artificial humanoid (the Golem) by humans. This legend accompanied modern thought through the writings of seminal nineteenth- and twentieth-century authors and scholars such as Jacob Grimm, Gustav Meyrink, Franz Kafka, and more concretely through Gershom Scholem's twentieth-century influential research.42 In one of the well-known versions of this legend, the obliteration of God's name from the Golem's forehead (the metaphoric death of God by the hand of the human creator) results in the murder of the creator by the Golem (the metaphoric murder of the human being by its own technological creation). Löwith's reflections on Heidegger's death of God, nihilism, and the murder of human beings by means of human technology seem to perform a rather tacit play on this exact implication of the ancient Jewish legend. He therefore dismissed Heidegger's own rejection of technology, regarding his philosophy as the source for the industrial and technological annihilation of humans, which characterized for him the Nazi era.

#### Scenario planning is possible in a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 04

 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### Role of the ballot is to endorse the best government policy – engagement in policy debates is a prerequisite to consciousness shift

**Crist 4** (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the **opportune** historical **moment** for **intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences** to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and **policy changes** to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how **students** in the human sciences are **trained** to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of **messages percolate to the public from the academy** about the nature of scientific findings, **matter immensely**. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

Perm do both

**Perm—do both. Action and ontological reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.**

**Padrutt 92**

[Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, Heidegger and the

Earth, ―Heidegger and Ecology,‖ ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31]

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

Perm do the plan and then the alternative

Perm do the alt and then the plan,

#### Alt cant solve:

#### Their ontology first args are tautologies that stifle effective politics

Graham 2k -- Graduate School of Management, Queensland (P, Heidegger’s Hippies, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf)

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus:

The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69)

Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998):

Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128).

Identity politics - the ontological imperative - is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most wellevidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).

#### Experts are critical—they have extensive knowledge of primary and secondary works in their field, and the capacity to correctly apply that information to new situations

Goldman, 2001

[Alvin, University of Arizona, “Experts: Which ones should you trust?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63.1, 85-110, Online, <http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/SeminarFall2007/October%2031st/Goldman%20-%20Experts%20Which%20Ones%20Should%20You%20Trust.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Before addressing this question, we should say more about the nature of expertise and the sorts of experts we are concerned with here. Some kinds of experts a r e unusually accomplished at certain skills, including violinists, billiards players, textile designers, and s o forth. These are not the kinds of experts with which epistemology is most naturally concerned. For epistemological purposes we shall mainly focus on cognitive or intellectual experts: people who have (or claim to have) a superior quantity or level of knowledge in s ome domain and an ability to generate new knowledge in answer to questions within the domain. Admittedly, there are elements of skill or know-how in intellectual matters too, so the boundary between skill expertise and cognitive expertise is not a sharp one. Nonetheless, I shall try to work on only one side of this rough divide, the intellectual side. How shall we define expertise in the cognitive sense? What distinguishes an expert from a layperson, in a given cognitive domain? I'll begin by specifying an objective sense of expertise, what it is to be an expert, not what it is to have a reputation for expertise. Once the objective sense is specified, the reputational sense readily follows: a reputational expert is someone widely believed to be an expert (in the objective sense), whether or not he really is one. Turning to objective expertise, then, I first propose that cognitive expertise be defined in "veritistic" (truth-linked) terms. As a first pass, experts in a given domain (the E-domain) have more beliefs (or high degrees of belief) in true propositions and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain than most people do (or better: than the vast majority of people do). According to this proposal, expertise is largely a comparative matter. However, I do not think it is wholly comparative. If the vast majority of people are full of false beliefs in a domain and Jones exceeds them slightly by not succumbing t o a few falsehoods that a r e widely shared, that still d o e s not ma k e him an "expert" (from a God's-eye point of view). To qualify as a cognitive expert, a person must possess a substantial body of truths in the target domain. Being an expert is not simply a matter of veritistic superiority to most of the community. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be reached, though there is great vagueness in setting this threshold. Expertise is not all a matter of possessing accurate information. It includes a capacity or disposition to deploy or exploit this fund of information to form beliefs in true answers to new questions that may be posed in the domain. This arises from some set of skills or techniques that constitute part of what it is to be an expert. An expert has the (cognitive) know-how, when presented with a new question in the domain, to go to the right sectors of his information-bank and perform appropriate operations on this information; or to deploy some external apparatus or data-banks to disclose relevant material. So expertise features a propensity element as well as an element of actual attainment. A third possible feature of expertise may require a little modification in what we said earlier. To discuss this feature, let us distinguish the primary and secondary questions in a domain. Primary questions are the principal questions of interest to the researchers or students of the subject-matter. Secondary questions concern the existing evidence or arguments that bear on the primary questions, and the assessments of the evidence made by prominent researchers. In general, an expert in a field is someone who has (comparatively) extensive knowledge (in the weak sense of knowledge, i.e., true belief) of the state of the evidence, and knowledge of the opinions and reactions to that evidence by prominent workers in the field. In the central sense of "expert" (a strong sense), an expert is someone with an unusually extensive body of knowledge on both primary and secondary questions in the domain. However, there may also be a weak sense of "expert", in which it includes someone who merely has extensive knowledge on the secondary questions in the domain. Consider two people with strongly divergent views on the primary questions in the domain, so that one of them is largely right and the other is largely wrong. By the original, strong criterion, the one who is largely wrong would not qualify as an expert. People might disagree with this as the final word on the matter. They might hold that anyone with a thorough knowledge of the existing evidence and the differing views held by the workers in the field deserves to be called an expert. I concede this by acknowledging the weak sense of "expert". Applying what has been said above, we can say that an expert (in the strong sense) in domain D is someone who possesses an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and successful deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain. Anyone purporting to be a (cognitive) expert in a given domain will claim to have such a fund and set of methods, and will claim to have true answers to the question ( ~ ) under dispute because he has applied his fund and his methods to the question(s). The task for the layperson who is consulting putative experts, and who hopes thereby to learn a true answer to the target question, is to decide who has superior expertise, or who has better deployed his expertise to the question at hand. T h e novicet2-experts problem is whether a layperson can justifiably choose one putative expert as more credible or trustworthy than the other with respect to the question at hand, and what might be the epistemic basis for such a choice ?

## Heidegger

**Technological thought is good, and we can use it without losing our relation to Being**

**LaTour 90**

[Bruno LaTour, professor of sociology, School of mines, (*We have never been modern,* trans. Porter, pp 65-67) 1990]

But immediately the philosopher loses this well-intentioned simplicity. Why? Ironically, he himself indicates the reason for this, in an apologue on Heraclitus who used to take shelter in a baker’s oven. ‘*Einai gar hai entautha theous’* – ‘here, too the gods are present,’ said Heraclitus to visitors who were astonished to see him warming his poor carcass like an ordinary mortal (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 233). *‘Auch heir nämlich wesen Götter an.’* But Heidegger is taken in as much as those naïve visitors, since he and his epigones do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest Holzwege. Being cannot reside in ordinary beings. Everywhere, there is desert. The gods cannot reside in technology – that pure Enframing (Zimmerman, 1990) of being. [*Ge-Stell*], that ineluctable fate [Geschick], that supreme danger [Gefahr]. They are not to be sought in science, either, since science has no other essence but that of technology (Heidegger, 1977b). They are absent from politics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, history – which is the history of Being, and counts its epochs in lillenia. The gods cannot reside in economics – that pure calculation forever mired in beings and worry. They are not to be found in philosophy, either, or in ontology, both of which lost sight of their destiny 2,500 years ago. This Heidegger treats the modern world as the visitors treat Heraclitus: with contempt. Any yet – ‘here too the gods are present: in a hydroelectric plant on the banks of the Rhine, in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in agribusiness as well as in timeworn landscapes, in shopkeepers’ calculations as well as in Holderlin’s heartrending verse. But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them? Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us. The moderns indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-Stell], that economics is pure calculation, capitalism pure reproduction, the subject pure consciousness. Purity everywhere! They claim this, it we must be careful not to take them at their word , since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distile whet the work of hybridization supplies. Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure ‘stock’. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse: Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness its mark, its trace of BeingXX? This is never in anyone’s power: otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes, anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, ‘the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believes in barbarism.1 (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987, p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, seeing empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest – then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. aaaBut what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger’s epigones have converted the glaring weakness into a strength. ‘We don’t know anything empirical, but that doesn’t matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.’ On the contrary we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the **difference** between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget being, since there has never been a modern world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzchean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counterrevolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: *“Einai gar kai entatuba theous”*

#### Technological thought inevitable

Kateb 97 (George, Prof of Philosophy @ Princeton, "Technology and Philosophy," Social Research, Fall, p. ebscohost)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity -- and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives -- would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastropheaaaa that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence.